How to catch the identity attacks your other tools can’t see

Identity threat detection and response (ITDR) is critical for identity resilience. Here’s why.

of ransomware attacks targeted identity infrastructure

Source: Semperis, 2026 Ransomware Risk Report

It takes an average of

0 days

to identify and contain attacks that start with stolen credentials

Source: IBM, Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026

Your endpoint tools look for malicious files and known-bad processes. A valid, stolen credential is neither.

Attackers know what you monitor. They bypass standard event logs and disable audit agents.

Once logging is off or cleared, log-based tools have nothing left to alert on.

Attackers use completely legitimate identity processes and mechanics to wreak havoc.

Identity threat detection and response closes those gaps.

If you restore identity from backup without knowing and fixing what went wrong, you’ll bring the attacker back into your environment. Detection without recovery is only half a strategy.

Recovery without detection becomes a reinfection loop.

If you don’t continuously harden your identity infrastructure both before and after an attack, your identity services will remain exposed and vulnerable.

Prepare for an attack

Harden your identity infrastructure to shrink exposure and limit the blast radius.
See every change

Monitor the AD replication stream to catch malicious changes when an attacker disables logging or clears security logs.
Undo bad changes

Suspicious changes roll back automatically, down to a single attribute.
Know where you stand

Ongoing scans for indicators of exposure and compromise, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, MITRE D3FEND, and ANSSI, so findings match the language your security team already uses.
Recover clean and quick

Automated, malware-free recovery from immutable, isolated backups restores identity to a trusted state in hours, not days or weeks.

Attack phase

Technique (MITRE ID)	What it flags
AS-REP Roasting (T1558.004)	Admins with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled
Kerberoasting (T1558.003)	Users (usually a service account) with SPN not supporting AES encryption
DCSync (T1003.006)	Non-default principal with DCSync rights on the domain
Golden Ticket (T1558.001)	Kerberos KRBTGT account with old password

Technique (MITRE ID)	What it flags
Exploitation for privilege escalation / Zerologon (T1068)	Zerologon vulnerability
SID-History Injection (T1134.005)	Principal with well-known privileged SID in SIDHistory
BadSuccessor (emerging, no MITRE ID yet)	Potential KRBTGT takeover through BadSuccessor