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November 2026 Newsletter: 
Anti-Analysis Tactics & Data Theft Unmasked

Cohesity REDLab is the data protection industry’s only dedicated source of actionable intelligence on how malware interacts with backup infrastructure. This team of experts operates an air-gapped facility where live malware is executed against production-grade Cohesity DataProtect and Cohesity NetBackup deployments. By analyzing sophisticated malware, researchers gain deeper insight into emerging techniques and tactics. These findings help drive the design and enhancement of advanced threat detection and scanning technologies, strengthening defences against ransomware attacks. 

This newsletter provides monthly updates on the most impactful ransomware strains evaluated in REDLab, along with comprehensive findings concerning detection and recovery procedures. 

Cohesity DataProtect and NetBackup in REDLab 

REDLab incorporates both Cohesity DataProtect and Cohesity NetBackup to conduct extensive testing against malware and sophisticated cyberattacks. Through live malware execution, real-world exploit detonation, and modern attack techniques, REDLab evaluates the performance of Cohesity solutions under authentic attack conditions. Its air-gapped environment enables comprehensive threat assessment in a controlled setting. REDLab testing is guided by the following principles: 

  • Live, Current Threats: Every strain detonated in REDLab is active malware sourced from real-world circulation - not synthetic samples or theoretical attack models - ensuring results reflect the threats security teams face today. 
  • Production-Grade Conditions: Tests are conducted on fully configured DataProtect and NetBackup deployments within an air-gapped facility designed to mirror real customer environments, rather than simplified lab setups. 
  • Continuously Expanding Scope: REDLab’s threat library is updated monthly with newly identified ransomware families and attack techniques, ensuring testing evolves alongside the threat landscape. 
     

REDLab Findings 

During this month, the malware strains listed below were intentionally detonated to evaluate product efficacy of Cohesity DataProtect and NetBackup.

Strain Details

SHA-256 Hash
(link to mode details on VirusTotal)

Name: Akira 
Family: Akira 

67afa125bf8812cd943abed2ed56ed6e07853600ad609b40bdf9ad4141e612b4

Name: Qilin 
Family: Qilin (Agenda) 

37546b811e369547c8bd631fa4399730d3bdaff635e744d83632b74f44f56cf6

Name: Majinahanashi 
Family: Majinahanashi Ransomware Group

98565754be5c8c6bf8e6bfd9c27405849dd055ac3b35e0a7076be4a649fc8bf1

Name: Black Basta 
Family: Black Basta

5d2204f3a20e163120f52a2e3595db19890050b2faa96c6cba6b094b0a52b0aa

Akira Ransomware

Technique Name

MITRE ATT&CK ID

Tactic(s)

Data Encrypted for Impact 

T1486 

Impact

Service Stop 

T1489

Impact

Obfuscated Files or Information

T1027

Defense Evasion

Software Packing 

T1027.002 

Defense Evasion

Impair Defenses

T1562

Defense Evasion

Disable or Modify Tools

T1562.001 

Defense Evasion

Create or Modify System Process

T1543

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Windows Service

T1543.003

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

OS Credential Dumping 

T1003

Credential Access 

Unsecured Credentials 

T1552 

Credential Access 

Credentials In Files 

T1552.001 

Credential Access

Credentials from Password Stores 

T1555 

Credential Access

Credentials from Web Browsers 

T1555.003 

Credential Access 

Replication Through Removable Media 

T1091 

Initial Access, Lateral Movement 

Application Layer Protocol 

T1071

Command and Control

Data from Local System 

T1005

Collection 

System Owner/User Discovery 

T1033 

Discovery

System Information Discovery 

T1082 

Discovery

File and Directory Discovery 

T1083 

Discovery

Note: Above table contains a curated subset of techniques prioritized for monitoring and response.

Malware impact post execution

Akira was selected for this month's report as one of the most active ransomware operations in the current landscape. Open-source tracking attributes roughly 1,500 leak-site victims to the group since it emerged in 2023, including a record 84 disclosures in March 2026 alone, and ranks it second only to Qilin by volume for the first quarter of 2026. The ransom note recovered in this detonation explicitly asserts that backups were destroyed before encryption, making Akira a direct test of recovery resilience. 

Akira is a 64-bit Windows PE console payload (approximately 570 KB). A static YARA match confirmed the Akira family, and the binary is packed, carrying an unknown PE section name. 

Before encrypting, the sample performs light environmental checks. It queries the keyboard layout and system locale, checks its process token for administrator or Windows User Account Control (UAC) elevation status, queries the FIPS cryptography policy and installs a SetUnhandledExceptionFilter anti-debug hook. A date-expiration style check was also observed, in which the process exits shortly after reading the local time. 

Encryption is fast and highly parallel. The strain systematically walks user directories with wildcards, binds a large number of files to I/O Completion Ports for asynchronous encryption and overwrites existing files. Every affected file is renamed with an “.iqoj” extension, and a single ransom note filename, “readme-asldkas”, is copied across multiple directories. 

The sample also attempts to stop active services, a pattern commonly used to release file locks held by databases and backup agents, and creates an autorun.inf file to propagate through removable media. REDLab analysis recorded theft of private information from local browsers and HTTP requests carrying features characteristic of malware traffic, including a request to a commonly exploitable directory path. The ransom note claims that corporate data was exfiltrated and backups removed, offers a test decryption, threatens publication on the group’s blog and directs the victim to a Tor-based chat portal using a victim-specific access code, confirming a double-extortion posture. 

Figure 1

Figure 1: Victim files following detonation, each appended with the “.iqoj” extension.

Figure 2

Figure 2: The “readme-asldkas” ransom note claiming data theft and backup destruction, with the Tor portal details redacted. 

Protection & Detection Outcomes

Both DataProtect and NetBackup performed successful VMware backup and recovery following the attack. DataProtect VMware backup operations remained unaffected throughout. NetBackup's Image Entropy anomaly detection actively identified unusual deviation in VMware backup job attributes demonstrating its threat detection capabilities working as designed. VMware based backup and recovery was successful for both products. 

Figure 3

Figure 3: Akira NetBackup Entropy Anomaly Result. 

Threat Hunting Results

Following the ransomware attack, Rapid Threat Hunt was leveraged to proactively search for malicious activity using known SHA-256 hash and IOC associated with the Akira ransomware. The hunt successfully identified impacted clusters, objects, and file artifacts within the environment, providing clear visibility into the scope of compromise. 

Figure 4

Figure 4: Akira Rapid Threat Hunt Result. 

Qilin Ransomware

Technique Name

MITRE ATT&CK ID

Tactic(s)

Service Stop 

T1489 

Impact

Inhibit System Recovery 

T1490

Impact

Obfuscated Files or Information 

T1027

Defense Evasion

Process Injection 

T1055 

Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Indicator Removal

T1070

Defense Evasion

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

T1497

Defense Evasion, Discovery

Impair Defenses 

T1562 

Defense Evasion

Hijack Execution Flow 

T1574 

Defense Evasion, Execution

Create or Modify System Process 

T1543 

Persistence, Privilege Escalation 

Command and Scripting Interpreter 

T1059 

Execution

Native API

T1106 

Execution 

Shared Modules 

T1129

Execution 

System Services 

T1569 

Execution

Input Capture 

T1056 

Collection, Credential Access 

Application Layer Protocol 

T1071 

Command and Control

Proxy 

T1090 

Command and Control

Archive Collected Data 

T1560 

Collection

System Information Discovery 

T1082 

Discovery

File and Directory Discovery 

T1083

Discovery

Network Share Discovery 

T1135 

Discovery

Software Discovery 

T1518

Discovery

Note: Above table contains a curated subset of techniques prioritized for monitoring and response.

Malware impact post execution

According to our research, Qilin was the most active ransomware group of 2026 to date. Open-source tracking shows about 100 leak-site listings per month on average. The group hit a record of at least 165 incidents in August 2026. It has been the leading ransomware operation since the second quarter of 2025. Its affiliate model has also reportedly seeded newer brands, including The Gentlemen, which was evaluated in last month's edition.

Qilin (also tracked as Agenda) is a 32-bit Windows PE console payload (approximately 1.6 MB) that requires an operator-supplied “-password” argument to run. Static analysis matched multiple YARA rules and showed a thread-local-storage section, a registered vectored exception handler and a SetUnhandledExceptionFilter hook, consistent with anti-analysis and execution-flow hijacking. 

When launched with the password argument, the sample prints a 45-second pre-encryption notification and then turns to service manipulation. It attempted to stop or disable BrokerInfrastructure, ClipSVC, gpsvc, NgcCtnrSvc, RmSvc, SamSs, tiledatamodelsvc, TimeBrokerSvc, VSS, WinDefend and wudfsvc. Several calls failed with access-denied errors, but the Volume Shadow Copy service and several others were stopped and disabled, and an explicit attempt to remove shadow copies failed with a non-zero exit code. 

Encryption runs in global traversal mode across local and attached volumes. In this detonation the sample encrypted 5,457 files in roughly 31 seconds, appending a randomly generated ten-character extension (“.gBBQsRxAcQ”) and writing a “README-RECOVER” ransom note named with the same identifier into each directory; repeated “file exists” errors confirm the note was already present in many folders. Files that could not be opened were skipped with “can’t open file” warnings. 

The ransom note claims that sensitive data was downloaded, listing employee personal data, a complete network map with credentials, financial records and manufacturing schematics. It warns that modifying files or using third-party recovery tools will prevent decryption, states that police or authorities cannot help recover the key and directs the victim to a Tor-hosted portal using victim-specific credentials, confirming a double-extortion posture. 

Figure 5

Figure 5: Victim files following detonation, each appended with the “.gBBQsRxAcQ” extension. 

Figure 6

Figure 6: The “README-RECOVER” ransom note claiming data theft and listing the stolen data categories, with the Tor portal credentials redacted. 

Protection & Detection Outcomes

Both DataProtect and NetBackup performed successful VMware backup and recovery following the attack. DataProtect VMware backup operations remained unaffected throughout. NetBackup's Image Entropy anomaly detection actively identified unusual deviation in VMware backup job attributes demonstrating its threat detection capabilities working as designed. VMware based backup and recovery was successful for both products. 

Figure 7

Figure 7: Qilin NetBackup Entropy Anomaly Result. 

Threat Hunting Results

Following the ransomware attack, Rapid Threat Hunt was leveraged to proactively search for malicious activity using known SHA-256 hash and IOC associated with the Qilin ransomware. The hunt successfully identified impacted clusters, objects, and file artifacts within the environment, providing clear visibility into the scope of compromise. 

Figure 8

Figure 8: Qilin Rapid Threat Hunt Result. 

Majinahanashi Ransomware

Technique Name

MITRE ATT&CK ID

Tactic(s)

Data Destruction

T1485

Impact

Data Encrypted for Impact

T1486

Impact

Service Stop 

T1489

Impact

Inhibit System Recovery

T1490

Impact

Indicator Removal

T1070

Defense Evasion 

Indirect Command Execution

T1202

Defense Evasion

Bootkit

T1542.003

Defense Evasion, Persistence

Impair Defenses 

T1562 

Defense Evasion

Disable or Modify Tools 

T1562.001 

Defense Evasion

Hide Artifacts 

T1564 

Defense Evasion

Hidden Window 

T1564.003 

Defense Evasion

Create or Modify System Process

T1543 

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Windows Service 

T1543.003 

Persistence, Privilege Escalation 

Command and Scripting Interpreter 

T1059 

Execution

Application Layer Protocol 

T1071 

Command and Control

System Owner/User Discovery 

T1033 

Discovery

Process Discovery 

T1057 

Discovery

System Information Discovery 

T1082 

Discovery

Note: Above table contains a curated subset of techniques prioritized for monitoring and response. 

Malware impact post execution

Majinahanashi was selected as an emerging double-extortion group first observed in mid-2026. Open-source reporting dates its first activity to between July and August 2026. It credits the group with roughly 40 claimed victims so far. Counts vary by tracker. The victims include hospitality, e-commerce, manufacturing, construction, and engineering firms located in the United Kingdom, Europe, Malaysia, and the United States.

The group reportedly rebranded its leak site on October 2, 2026, indicating active and continuing development. 

Majinahanashi is a compact 64-bit Windows PE payload (GUI subsystem, approximately 90 KB). Despite its small size, the payload carries an extensive pre-encryption routine. 

Before encrypting, the sample profiles the host extensively. It queries the keyboard layout, system locale, language registry key, computer name and available memory, enumerates services and running processes (expressing interest in specific processes) and reads the volume serial number and physical hardware ID for victim profiling. It also checks its token for administrator or UAC elevation status, queries the FIPS cryptography policy, resolves functions dynamically, uses a mutex for inter-process synchronization and installs a SetUnhandledExceptionFilter anti-debug hook. A date-expiration check was observed, and the process created a hidden window to keep the activity off-screen. 

Encryption is broad and destructive. The payload uses Restart Manager sessions to release locked files, performs a large number of encryption calls using the same key, and REDLab analysis recorded mass file deletion and overwriting of existing files. Every affected file is renamed with a “.majin” extension, and a single ransom note filename, “README”, is copied across multiple directories. 

Anti-recovery is thorough. The sample attempts to stop active services, modifies boot configuration through bcdedit, deletes or modifies volume shadow copies, clears Windows event logs and issues suspicious IO control codes consistent with disk enumeration or bootkit and wiper behavior, while using Windows utilities to carry out parts of the routine indirectly. The ransom note asserts that backups and shadow copies were removed and that internal data was extracted, offers to decrypt two files as proof, directs contact through qTOX and email and sets a seven-day deadline before the full dataset is released on a Tor disclosure site. 

Figure 9

Figure 9: Victim files following detonation, each appended with the “.majin” extension. 

Figure 10

Figure 10: The “README” ransom note listing the verification offer, seven-day disclosure timeline and Tor disclosure site, with contact details redacted. 

Protection & Detection Outcomes

Both DataProtect and NetBackup performed successful VMware backup and recovery following the attack. DataProtect VMware backup operations remained unaffected throughout. NetBackup's Image Entropy anomaly detection actively identified unusual deviation in VMware backup job attributes demonstrating its threat detection capabilities working as designed. VMware based backup and recovery was successful for both products. 

Figure 11

Figure 11: The Gentlemen Entropy Anomaly Result. 

Threat Hunting Results

Following the ransomware attack, Rapid Threat Hunt was leveraged to proactively search for malicious activity using known SHA-256 hash and IOC associated with the Majinahanashi ransomware. The hunt successfully identified impacted clusters, objects, and file artifacts within the environment, providing clear visibility into the scope of compromise. 

Figure 12

Figure 12: Majinahanashi Rapid Threat Hunt Result. 

Black Basta Ransomware 

Technique Name

MITRE ATT&CK ID

Tactic(s)

Data Encrypted for Impact

T1486

Impact

Masquerading 

T1036 

Defense Evasion 

Modify Registry 

T1112

Defense Evasion

Indirect Command Execution 

T1202

Defense Evasion

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

T1497

Defense Evasion, Discovery

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism 

T1548

Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

Hide Artifacts

T1564

Defense Evasion

Hidden Window

T1564.003 

Defense Evasion

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Execution

Create or Modify System Process

T1543

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Windows Service

T1543.003

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059

Execution

Application Layer Protocol 

T1071

Command and Control

Data Staged 

T1074 

Collection

System Owner/User Discovery 

T1033 

Discovery

System Information Discovery 

T1082 

Discovery 

Note: Above table contains a curated subset of techniques prioritized for monitoring and response. 

Malware impact post execution 

Black Basta is a 32-bit Windows PE console payload (approximately 560 KB). 

The sample performs several anti-analysis and profiling checks before encrypting. It checks for mouse movement and available memory, queries the keyboard layout, locale and language registry key, reads the volume serial number and physical hardware ID, queries the FIPS cryptography policy and checks its token for administrator or UAC elevation status. It enumerates mount points and registry mount points to identify local, removable and network drives, reads the memory of another process, creates a hidden window, runs commands with the /C switch so the shell terminates on completion and installs a SetUnhandledExceptionFilter anti-debug hook. A date-expiration check was also observed. 

Persistence is established through several mechanisms in parallel: autorun at Windows startup, a scheduled task and a service that was created but not started. Boot configuration is modified through bcdedit, volume shadow copies are deleted or modified, and the sample attempted to restart the guest machine, behavior associated with anti-sandbox restarts and recovery-resistant reboots. 

Impact is branded and visible. Registry keys are modified for file-extension hijacking so that encrypted files receive a custom “.basta” type and icon, the Recycle Bin is manipulated, and the desktop wallpaper is replaced with a notice that the network is encrypted by the Black Basta group and that instructions are in “readme.txt”. The note claims data was stolen and encrypted, threatens publication on a Tor leak site, offers free decryption of one file and supplies a victim-specific company identifier. The sample also issued HTTP requests with features characteristic of malware traffic, including a request to a commonly exploitable directory path. 

Figure 13

Figure 13: The “readme” ransom note claiming data theft and encryption, with the Tor portal address and company identifier redacted. 

 

Figure 14

Figure 14: Desktop wallpaper replaced after encryption with a notice that the network is encrypted by the Black Basta group. 

Protection & Detection Outcomes

Both DataProtect and NetBackup performed successful VMware backup and recovery following the attack. DataProtect VMware backup operations remained unaffected throughout. NetBackup's Image Entropy anomaly detection actively identified unusual deviation in VMware backup job attributes demonstrating its threat detection capabilities working as designed. VMware based backup and recovery was successful for both products. 

Figure 15

Figure 15: Black Basta NetBackup Entropy Anomaly Result. 

Threat Hunting Results

Following the ransomware attack, Rapid Threat Hunt was leveraged to proactively search for malicious activity using known SHA-256 hash and IOC associated with the Black Basta ransomware. The hunt successfully identified impacted clusters, objects, and file artifacts within the environment, providing clear visibility into the scope of compromise. 

Figure 16

Figure 16: Black Basta Rapid Threat Hunt Result. 

Summary 

  • Both DataProtect and NetBackup achieved successful VMware backup and recovery across all four ransomware strains tested this month – Akira, Qilin, Majinahanashi and Black Basta, demonstrating the resilience of Cohesity's solutions under real-world attack conditions. 
  • DataProtect VMware backup operations remained unaffected throughout all tests, validating the platform's ability to maintain data protection under adverse conditions. 
  • NetBackup's Image Entropy anomaly detection actively identified unusual deviations in VMware backup job attributes - confirming its active threat detection capabilities working as designed. VMware based backup and recovery was successful. 
  • Rapid Threat Hunt enabled proactive threat investigation by correlating known malicious SHA‑256 hashes and IOCs against protected environments, successfully identifying impacted clusters, objects and file artifacts.

For more information on REDLab, please visit  https://www.cohesity.com/redlab  

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